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Crow: Indian Law

INDIAN LAW
WATER, WATER EVERYWHERE:
U.S. v. ADAIR KEEPS INDIAN RIGHTS
IN FEDERAL COURT

I. INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Adair1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that federal court was the proper forum for adjudicating federally reserved water rights even though a state action
was in progress on substantially the same issue. 2 The court also
determined the substantive water rights of the Klamath Indian
Tribe and its members, of successors to Indian lands and of the
federal government. 3
In 1975, the United States, on behalf of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Forest Service,· filed suit in U.S. District
Court in Oregon against 600 private landowners for a declaration
of the water rights on the former Klamath Indian Reservation.tI
1. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983); (per Fletcher, J.; the other panel members were
Goodwin, J. and Kilkenny, J.) (as modified on denial of rehearing Jan. 24, 1984) cert.
denied sub nom. Oregon v. United States, 52 U.S.L.W. 3906 (U.S. June 18, 1984) (No.
83-1735).
2. Pursuant to OR. REV. STATS. §§ 539.010-539.110 (1979), an administrative proceeding was initiated in January 1976 by the Water Resources Department to determine
water rights in the Williamson River system. 723 F.2d at 1398-99.
3. 723 F.2d at 1408-17.
4. This is an unusual aspect of the case because the government usually represents
the interests of the Indians in water rights suits. In this case, the government owned
70 % of the former reservation land and represented the agencies in charge of those
lands. 723 F.2d at 1398. Since the Tribe intervened, the conflict of interest issue was not
raised. Id. at 1407. There was clearly potential conflict between government attorneys
arguing on behalf of the agencies claiming as successors-in-interest and government attorneys representing the Tribe arguing for Indian interests. See Nevada v. United States,
103 S.Ct. 2906, 2917 (1983) reh'g denied 104 S.Ct. 210 (1983).
5. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979). The Klamath Indian Reservation had been terminated in 1961 pursuant to the Klamath Termination Act of 1954.
25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564w (1982). The Act allowed tribal members to receive cash in exchange for their interest in tribal lands. In order to pay members who chose this option

151

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 9

152

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:151

The district court held that under the terms of the treaty6 establishing the reservation the Klamath Tribe possessed reserved
water rights for hunting and fishing with a priority date of time
immemoriaF and water rights for irrigation with a priority date
of 1864. Additionally, Indian allottees6 were entitled to water
rights for irrigation with a priority date of 1864,9 subject to the
hunting and fishing water rights. The court also held that nonIndian successors lO were entitled to sufficient water to irrigate
acreage actually being irrigated at the time titled passed as well
as additional acreage subsequently placed under irrigation. The
priority date for both uses was 1864. 11 In addition, the district
(1659 out of 2113 members, or 78% of the Tribe) the government sold a large portion of
reservation lands. The government and private individuals purchased the lands. The balance of the land was placed in trust with a bank to be managed for the remaining members of the Tribe. In 1958 the government purchased 15,000 acres of forest lands on the
former reservation. This purchase extended the Winema National Forest adjacent to the
reservation. Since 1893 the government had been withdrawing lands in that area from
the public domain in order to establish a national forest. In 1973 the government condemned additional forest lands on the former reservation to add to the Forest. 478 F.
Supp. at 340. In 1960 the government bought 15,000 acres of the Klamath Marsh, the
heart of the former reservation, to establish a refuge to benefit migrating birds and other
wildlife. In 1961 the government made additional purchases of land in order to pay members of the Tribe. In 1973 most of the lands held in trust by the bank were condemned
and the balance of the trust lands were sold to private individuals. Id.
6. Treaty between the United States of America and the Klamath and Moadoc
Tribes and the Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707. Article I of
the Treaty secured for the Indians the exclusive right to hunt and fish on the reservation. Id.
7. Id. Article I recognized rights which predated the Treaty by over 1000 years, and
therefore the correct priority date for water rights to support hunting and fishing rights
was "time immemorial" rather than the date of the Treaty. 723 F.2d at 1412-14.
8. "Allottees" refers to Indians who received parcels of land pursuant to the General
Allotment (Dawes) Act. 24 Stat. 388 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-411 (1976)). The purpose of the Act was to convert Indians to an agricultural lifestyle by allotting parcels of
reservation lands to heads of families. There was an initial trust period of up to 25 years
during which the allottee could not alienate the lands. The Act succeeded in breaking up
tribal lands through sales of non-allotted lands to non-Indians and sales and leases by
allottees after they received title. At the time of the suit the former Klamath Reservation of 168,000 acres was in the hands of over 600 private landowners, many of whom
were purchasers of allotments.
9. The date of priority comes from the 1864 Treaty. 16 Stat. 707. The Indians ceded
12 million acres to the United States government and agreed to reside permanently on
168,000 acres. Under the reserved rights doctrine, the treaty date is the usual priority
date for water rights for irrigation because one of the primary purposes of establishing
Indian reservations was to encourage development of agriculture. See infra notes 37 and
38.
10. This group consisted of purchasers of Indian allotments and of Indian lands sold
after termination. See supra notes 5 and 8.
11. 478 F. Supp. at 349.
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court held that it was unnecessary to separately determine the
water rights of the federal government because they were coterminous with Indian rights. The State of Oregon and private
landowners appealed and the Klamath Tribe cross-appealed. 12
II. BACKGROUND

A. Jurisdiction
Indians historically have remained free of state court jurisdiction due to their sovereign relationship with the federal government. 13 However, tension has developed between state and
federal interests due to efforts by the states to exercise jurisdiction over various aspects of Indian affairs.14 Water rights appurtenant to federal reservations have traditionally remained
outside the jurisdiction of the states due to the sovereign immunity of the United States. 10 Until 1952 this immunity prevented
states from exerting jurisdiction over Indian water rights claims.
However, the McCarran Amendment,16 enacted in 1952, waived
12. The State of Oregon intervened to assert its own rights as alleged owner of approximately 92,000 acres of former reservation lands as well as to support the claims of
individual landowners asserting state based rights. 478 F. Supp. at 343.
13. The most basic evidence of this relationship is contained in the Commerce
Clause which authorizes Congress to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ... and
with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. The inapplicability of state laws to
Indian affairs was first established by the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Recent cases upholding that decision include United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S.544 (1975), McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973),
and Williams v. Lee, 358 U.s. 217 (1959). See generally FELIX COHEN. HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, ch. 5, (1982) (hereinafter COHEN).
14. "There has been recurring tension between federal and state law; state authorities have not easily accepted the notion that federal law and federal courts must be
deemed the controlling considerations in dealing with the Indians." Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661. 678 (1974). See also Pelcyger, Indian Water
Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 743, 745-51 (1976).
15. It has also been argued that tribal sovereignty barred states from joining Indians
in state court actions. According to this view, the McCarran Amendment waives only
federal sovereign immunity thus having no effect on the ability of Indians to refuse state
court jurisdiction over their water rights claim. However the courts have accepted the
view that the United States, not the tribe, holds Indian water rights in trust. Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). See text accompanying note 18.
16. 43 U.S.C. § 66 (1976)
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in
any suit. . . for the adjudication of rights to the use of water
of a river system or other source, or ... for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is
the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, exchange, or oth-

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 9

154

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:151

the sovereign immunity defense of the United States to state
court jurisdiction in general stream adjudications. 17
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States,!8 the Supreme Court considered whether the McCarran
Amendment terminated federal jurisdiction over federal water
rights, including Indian water rights. The Court held that the
McCarran Amendment did not destroy federal court jurisdiction
over water rights and emphasized the general obligation of federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction. 19 However, dismissal of
erwise, and the United States is a necessary party to the suit.
The United States, when a party to such suit, shall ... be
deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws
are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable
thereto by reason of its sovereignty....
Id. The legislative history of the McCarran Amendment indicates Congress did not intend to address reserved water rights but only federal rights acquired pursuant to state
law. The states were primarily concerned with facilitating adjudication of all water rights
including those appurtenant to the vast federal landholdings in the West. Hearings
Before Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S.18: A Bill To Authorize
Suits Against the United States to Adjudicate and Administer Water Rights, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5, 21-22, 46-48, 81, 90 (1951). The reserved rights doctrine was interpreted as limited to Indian reservations, thus posing no question of federally based water
rights on other federal lands. Also, as of 1952 there had been only limited litigation of
Winters rights and limited awards to Indians. See United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). Despite the lack of Congressional intent to address Indian water rights under the McCarran Amendment, the Supreme Court in Colorado River held it applicable to adjudications of Indian rights. See text accompanying
notes 18-36.
17. A "general stream adjudication" refers to proceedings to determine the water
rights of all users of a particular water source. Limited suits for determination of Indian
rights are arguably not within the scope of the McCarran Amendment. 424 U.S. 800, 820
n.26. See also Note, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights Under the McCarran Amendment: Two Courts Are Better Than One, 71 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1023, 1024-27 (1983)
(hereinafter, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights).
18. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The United States, on its own behalf and that of certain
Indian tribes, brought suit in federal court against 1000 water users in Water District 7
in order to determine water rights based on both state and federal law, including reserved rights. Id. at 805. Pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, one of the defendants
attempted to join the United States in state court proceedings to adjudicate the same
issue. The district court granted a motion to dismiss on grounds of abstention. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that abstention was inappropriate and
that jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 which provides that "[e)xcept as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States, or by any agency or
officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of Congress." The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and held that while abstention was inappropriate, dismissal of
the suit from federal court was permissible.
19. The Court described this duty as "the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them." 424 U.S. at 817.
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the federal action in favor of state proceedings was held proper
for reasons of wise judicial administration. 20
The Court held that the policies behind the McCarran
Amendment were the most important factor favoring dismissal. 21 The major goal of the legislation was to avoid piecemeal
adjudication of water rights.22 This federal policy led the Court
to interpret the Amendment as allowing state court jurisdiction
over Indian water claims.
The Court also identified certain exceptional circumstances
in Colorado River which permitted dismissal of the federal suit.
If the federal forum was inconvenient for the litigants 23 and
there was a lack of progress in the federal suit, compared with
the concurrent proceedings in state court,2' then the policies of
the McCarran Amendment tipped the balance in favor of a state
court adjudication. 211
In Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,26 the Supreme
20. [d. (citing Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. CoO-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183
(1952)).
21. 424 U.S. at 819.
22. [d. See supra note 16.
23. The District Court was located in Denver, 300 miles from the state court. [d. at
820.
24. There were no proceedings in District Court beyond the filing of the complaint
before the motion to dismiss was entered. [d.
25. In addition the Court pointed to the government's participation in state court
water rights proceedings in three other water districts in the state. The Court failed to
note that none of those proceedings involved Indian water rights. Another factor was the
extent to which state water rights were to be adjudicated in the federal suit. The Court
implied that federal court was not the ideal forum for those determinations yet expressed no reservations about the ability of the state court to determine Indian water
rights and other federal rights. [d. at 820. See supra note 14.
26. 103 S.Ct. 3201 (1983). This was a consolidation of three Ninth Circuit cases decided by the same panel within three days of each other: Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080 (1982); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 668 F.2d 1093 (1982)
and Navajo Nation v. United States, 668 F.2d 1100 (1982). In each case either the United
States in its capacity as trustee, or the Indian tribes acting on their own behalf, attempted to have Indian water rights in Arizona or Montana decided in federal court. In
each case, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Colorado River on its facts and reversed federal court dismissals made in favor of state court proceedings. In San Carlos and Navajo
Nation, the Ninth Circuit held that due to disclaimers in the Enabling Act under which
Arizona received statehood and the Arizona Constitution, the state could not assert jurisdiction over Indian water claims. 103 S.Ct. at 3209. See also Note, Northern Cheyenne
Tribe v. Adsit: Are State Jurisdictional Disclaimers Still The Indian's Assurance of
Federal Jurisdiction? 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 329 (1983).
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Court applied the doctrine of Colorado River to another Indian
water rights case. 27 The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
held that the district court correctly deferred to the state court
even though the case concerned federal reserved water rights.
The issue concerned whether federal suits brought by Indians
and involving only Indian water rights were subject to dismissal
in favor of state court proceedings. 28
The Court concluded that, due to the policy of avoiding
piecemeal litigation expressed in the McCarran Amendment,
federal court deferral was proper even when the federal suit was
filed by Indians for the limited purpose of determining Indian
rights.29 The consolidation of proceedings at the state level furthered the goal of judicial economy. According to the Court, concurrent federal proceedings were likely to be duplicative and
wasteful. 80 The Court also emphasized that a race to the courthouse to control which forum would resolve the controversy
should be avoided. 81
27. The Supreme Court had previously interpreted Colorado River in a case unrelated to Indian water rights. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 103 S.Ct. 927 (1983) the issue was the propriety of a district court decision to
stay a federal suit brought under the Federal Arbitration Act out of deference to parallel
state litigation. In holding that the district court abused its discretion in granting the
stay, the Court emphasized that "the balance [is] heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction." I d. at 937.
28. 103 S.Ct. at 3212-13. Also at issue was whether the McCarran Amendment had
any effect in states which were admitted to the Union subject to enabling acts in which
Congress reserved absolute jurisdiction and control over Indian lands. Id. at 3210. Montana and Arizona were admitted under Acts which included such language. Enabling Act
of Feb. 22, 1889, § 4, 25 Stat. 677 (including Montana) and Enabling Act of June 20,
1910, § 20, 26 Stat. 569 (including Arizona). The Court held that since the purpose of the
McCarran Amendment was to resolve a problem encountered by all states, federal sovereign immunity from state jurisdiction, Congress must have intended it to apply to all
states. 103 S.Ct. at 3212.
29. Id. at 3215. This reasoning means that in order to gain control over Indian water
rights claims filed in federal court, a state could file a general water rights adjudication
in state court post-dating the federal suit and the federal court would be obliged to defer. The effect would be to prevent Indians from ever being able to litigate their rights in
federal court. The majority recognized this possibility by noting several hypotheticals in
which dismissal of the federal action would be inappropriate. Id. The fact pattern of
Adair encompassed a number of elements from those scenarios.
30. Id. at 3214. In his dissent, Justice Marshall notes that "exercise of federal jurisdiction here will not result in duplicative federal and state proceedings since the District
Court need only determine the water rights of the tribes." Id. at 3216.
31. Id. at 3214. The Court pointed out that the judgment of either court would ordinarily be res judicata in the other.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/9

6

Crow: Indian Law

1985]

INDIAN LAW

157

The Court characterized defense arguments in support of
federal jurisdiction favorably32 but found the goal of judicial
economy outweighed all other concerns. 33 The potential inhospitability of state proceedings to Indian claims,34 and the traditional freedom from state interference enjoyed by Indians 31i were
two concerns subordinated to the goal of judicial economy.36

B. Water Rights
Federal water rights derive from a separate doctrine than
either the riparian rights system 37 common in Eastern states or
the prior appropriation system 3S which governs the arid West. 39 .
In Winters v. United States,'o the Supreme Court first enuni32. Id. at 3213.
33. The majority emphasized the McCarran Amendment policies as determined in
Colorado River rather than the "exceptional circumstances" test for justifying dismissal.
That test had recently been upheld in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. See supra
note 27.
34. In his dissent Justice Stevens cites a number of sources which support the view
that the expectation of inhospitable treatment by state courts is well founded. 103 S.Ct.
at 3219 n.8, (Stevens, J. dissenting). See Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, supra
note 17, at 1053-54.
35. See supra note 14.
36. The dissent noted that since Indian reserved rights derive from a federal base,
those rights would necessarily take priority over state created water rights. Therefore,
separate adjudication of those federal rights would not necessarily be inefficient. 103
S.Ct. at 3217-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens stated that, "the state court will incorporate these claims-like claims . . . that have been formally adjudicated in the
past-into a single inclusive, binding decree for each water source." Id. at 3218. See also
424 U.S. at 824 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
37. Under the riparian rights system the right to water is an incident of landownership which may not be forfeited by non-use or abandonment. The quantity is limited
only by the necessity of sharing the same source with other landowners. In times of
shortage, water is shared on a pro rata basis. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 51.1 (R.
CLARK, ed., 1967) [hereinafter cited as CLARK.]
38. To claim water rights under the doctrine of prior appropriation, one must have
been the first to beneficially use and/or divert a specific quantity of water. The right can
be forfeited by non-use or abandonment. When shortages occur, the earliest (senior)
users receive their full appropriations while later Uunior) users receive what is left.
CLARK, supra note 37, at § 51.9. The first judicial recognition of the doctrine occured in
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 190 (1855), in which the California Supreme Court held the
riparian system inapplicable to the mining settlements of the West.
39. There are exceptions to this doctrine because several Western states have a combination of semi-arid and humid conditions. These states, including Oregon the site of
Adair, have hybrid statutory systems in which both riparian and appropriation principles are applied. See CLARK supra note 37, at § 51.
40. 207 U.S. 564 (1908). In this case, Montana had allowed private non-Indian landowners upstream from the Fort Belknap Reservation to appropriate and dam water from
the Milk River under the state permit system. Heavy upstream use left inadequate supplies for the agricultural needs of the Assiniboine Indians.
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cated the doctrine of Indian reserved water rights. The Court
held that the agreement 41 establishing the reservation impliedly
reserved the right to sufficient water to irrigate reservation
lands. 42 A priority date of 1888 was assigned to the right, making
it superior to the rights of non-Indian users who acquired their
rights pursuant to state law.
By using the date of the agreement rather than the date of
actual appropriation, the Court established the most significant
element of the reserved water right. The rights were not based
on actual use, but rather vested at the time lands were reserved
for a particular purpose. This was an exception to the federal
policy of recognizing state law as controlling water rights in nonnavigable streams. 48
The next issue adjudicated by the Supreme Court was
whether individual Indian allotteesH and assignees 4li had a right
to any portion of the water rights reserved for irrigation. In
United States v. Powers,46 the Court held that in order to fulfill
the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine, the water must ben41. The Fort Belknap Reservation was established by agreement rather than treaty.
25 Stat. 124 (1888).
42. 207 U.S. at 576. According to the Court, the intention of the government in
establishing the reservation was to convert the Indians from a "nomadic and uncivilized
people" to a "pastoral and civilized people." [d. Agriculture was considered an integral
part of this process, and thus the waters were reserved for irrigation purposes.
43. Desert Lands Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. § 321. Controversy surrounds the basis of
the reserved rights doctrine. One view holds that the Indians reserved all rights not specifically granted to the United States in treaties, including the right to sufficient water to
develop reservation lands. The other view holds that the United States in its capacity as
trustor, reserved water for Indian reservations at the time the lands were reserved.
Under the first view, Indian water rights are aboriginal and date from time immemorial.
Under the second view the rights were created by the United States at the time the
reservation was established. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. RESERVED
WATER RIGHTS FOR FEDERAL AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS: A GROWING CONTROVERSY IN
NEED OF RESOLUTION, 59 (1978). In Adair, the court examined the issue by separating the
purposes for which water had been reserved. 723 F.2d at 1419.
44. See supra note 8.
45. By the time the allotment program ended in 1934 pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1983), many Indians had sold or leased their allotments. Questions arose as to the extent of water rights available to their Indian and non. Indian successors.
46. 305 U.S. 527 (1939). The United States brought this suit on behalf of the Crow
Indian Tribe in Montana. The government sought to stop all upstream diversion of
water by non-Indian purchasers of Indian allotments. A drought from 1931-1934 so depleted the water supply that the diversions by non-Indians left no water for a reservation
irrigation project.
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efit all tribal members equally.47 Indian allottees and assignees
possessed a right to the reserved waters.48 The Court did not
'quantify or define the precise nature of allottees' rights. Nor did
the Court address the underlying issue which was the extent to
which non-Indian successors to allotted lands could benefit from
the reserved waters.
In United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation District,49 the
Ninth Circuit held that non-Indian successors possessed water
rights equal to those of Indian allottees.lio This meant that nonIndians became competitors with the Indians for unappropriated
waters reserved to benefit Indians. The court reasoned that the
Indians would benefit because their allotments could be sold or
leased at a higher value with appurtenant water rights. iii
In Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton li2 the Ninth Circuit denied the effectiveness of state water permits held by a
non-Indian purchaser of Indian allotments.1i3 The non-Indian
purchaser was only entitled to a right to water being used for
irrigation at the time title passed plus water for land irrigated
within a reasonable time after title passed. 1i4 Also, unlike Indians, the court noted that non-Indian successors could lose the
47. Id. at 532. The Court stated: "[U)nder the Treaty of 1888 waters within the
Reservation were reserved for the equal benefit of tribal members." Id.
48. Id. the Court also noted: "[W)hen allotments of land were duly made for exclusive use and thereafter conveyed in fee, the right to use some portion of the tribal waters
essential for cultivation passed to the owners." Id.
49. 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956). The Yakima Tribe challenged the diversion by
white settlers of water to which the Indians claimed reserved rights. In 1908, the Secretary of Interior entered into an agreement with the settlers which granted them 75% of
the water of Ahtanum Creek. At that time the Indians were only irrigating 1200 acres.
The defendants argued that Indian water rights were limited to their actual beneficial
use as of 1908 even though an irrigation project had quadrupled the irrigable acreage by
1915. The court reluctantly held that the Secretary acted within his powers in making
the agreement on behalf of the Indians. However, the court held that the Indians had a
right to any water wasted or not used by the settlers. In United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist. (Ahtanum II), 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 381 U.S. 924 (1965),
the court reneged on its conclusion as to the power of the Secretary to bargain away
Indian rights and denied that particular issue had ever been presented to the court.
50. 236 F.2d at 342.
51. Id.
52. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). See infra note
110.
53. Id. at 51.
54.Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1985

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 9

160

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:151

right to reserved water through non-use. 1I11
The major issue concerning Indian reserved rights not resolved by the Winters decision was the quantification of water
rights. In the years before the Supreme Court addressed the issue, the Ninth Circuit held that the quantity reserved included
water reasonably necessary for both present and future uses. 1I6
The principle that reserved rights must be flexible enough
to include future increases necessary to accomplish the purposes
of the reservation was upheld in Arizona u. California. 1I7 The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit view, stating that future
reserved water rights for Indian reservations would be based on
the total practicable irrigable acreage on the reservation. 1I8 The
court also noted that the doctrine of reserved rights applied to
all federal reservations whether created by executive order, statute or treaty.1I9
The development of the reserved rights doctrine has included two significant water rights cases unrelated to Indian
claims. These cases concerned land reserved by the federal government for purposes other than Indian reservations. In Cappaert u. United States,60 the Supreme Court held that the gov55. [d.

56. Conrad Investment Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir. 1908). The United
States sued a Montana irrigation corporation which was diverting water from a nonnavigable stream in which the Blackfeet Indian Reservation had reserved rights. Even
though the diversion began before the Indians had exercised their rights and though the
corporation had invested $500,000 in the irrigation project, the court held that the Indians were entitled to the entire flow. The court stated that "[w]hat amount of water will
be required for these purposes may not be determined with absolute accuracy at this
time, but the policy of the government [is to] reserve whatever water ... may be reasonably necessary, not only for present uses but for future requirements." [d. at 832.
[Emphasis added.]
57. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). This case, heard under the original jurisdiction of the Court
over controversies between states, was an adjudication of all water rights in the Upper
Colorado River system.
58. Id. at 600-01. "Practicably irrigable acreage" may include irrigation achieved
with the use of modern technology. Report from Simon H. Rifkind, Special Master, to
the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 267 (Dec. 5, 1960). See COHEN, supra note
13, at 589-90 for a discussion of the difficulties in determining "irrigable acreage."
59. 373 U.S. at 601. All executive order and statutory reservations have implied reservations of water. The method of determining the specific quantity depends upon the
purpose of the reservation. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). See text accompanying notes 60-65 infra.
60. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). The issue was whether the reservation of Devil's Hole as a
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ernment's intent to reserve unappropriated waters could be
inferred if the waters were necessary to accomplish the purposes
for which the reservation was created. 61 The Court held that
preservation of a rare fish was a purpose of the Devil's Hole National Monument and upheld a reservation of water sufficient to
sustain them.
In U.S. v. New Mexico,62 the Supreme Court refined Cappaert by holding that water may be impliedly reserved only for
the primary purposes of a reservation. 6s In setting aside the Gila
National Forest, the government was held to have reserved sufficient water for timber maintenance but not for aesthetic, recreational, or wildlife preservation purposes. 64 The Court noted
these purposes were only secondary ones on the reservation. 61i
In Kimball v. Callahan (Kimball 1),66 the Ninth Circuit
held that the Klamath Termination Act did not abrogate the
National Monument under the American Antiquities Preservation Act allowed an implication of federal reserved water rights in unappropriated water. The area was set aside in
1952 by a Presidential Proclamation. The Cappaerts owned adjacent lands and, under a
state permit, pumped out so much groundwater that a species of rare fish was endangered. The National Park Service unsuccessfully protested the Cappaerts application for
new permits from the state engineer. However, the district court issued a permanent
injunction against pumping below the minimum level necessary for sustaining the fish.
Upon affirmation by the higher courts, the reserved rights doctrine was extended to
groundwater.
61. Id. at 139.
62. 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The issue before the Court was whether the reservation of
land for the Gila National Forest carried with it reserved rights in the downstream flow
of the Rio Mimbres River for recreation, aesthetics, wildlife preservation and stock watering. The case focused on congressional intent behind the acts creating the forest.
Fairfax and Tarlock, No Water For the Woods: A Critical Analysis of United States u.
New Mexico, 15 IDAHO L.R. 509, 524-525 (1979).
63. 438 U.S. at 702.
64. Id. Water for secondary purposes must be acquired pursuant to state law.
65. Walton held that an Indian reservation could have dual purposes with implied
reserved water rights to fulfill both purposes. 647 F.2d at 48. The court held that the
primary purpose doctrine of United States u. New Mexico was inapplicable to Indians
for three reasons: treaties and agreements frequently did not articulate the purposes of
an Indian reservation; the implied purpose, to allow Indians to live in a self-sufficient
manner on the reserved lands, must be liberally construed; and thirdly, most reservations were created for the benefit of the Indians, not for its own benefit as in other types
of federal reservations. Id.
66. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974). This was an action for declaratory judgment for the
purposes of deciding whether Oregon state fish and wildlife regulations applied to Indians exercising treaty rights. It is referred to as Kimball I to distinguish it from later
litigation between the parties. See Kimball v. Callahan (Kimball Il). 590 F.2d 768 (9th
Cir. 1979).
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treaty rights of members who chose to withdraw from the
Tribe. s7 The court interpreted the treaty to imply a right to
hunt and trap as well as the specified right to fish. Members of
the Tribe, including those who had withdrawn, retained their
rights to hunt, fish and trap on former Indian lands. s8
III. COURT'S ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction
In holding that federal court was the proper forum for Indian water claims, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the facts of
Adair which differed significantly from both the Colorado River
and San Carlos Apache Tribe decisions. Duplicative, wasteful
litigation was not a potential problem in Adair because the only
issues presented to the federal court were the priorities of federal water rights based on Indian claims. so The Ninth Circuit
upheld the lower court's pre trial order declaring actual quantification of the rights to be within the jurisdiction of the State of
Oregon. 70 In addition, the court held that the seven year delay in
state proceedings had the effect of a stay, thus eliminating the
danger of the federal court duplicating state proceedings. 71
The court also distinguished the secondary factors of the
Colorado River test. In contrast to the infancy of the federal suit
in Colorado River, the federal court in Adair had already considered and decided complex substantive issues of federal water
rights. The court noted that the policy of judicial economy
would be frustrated by requiring dismissal and a rehearing at
67. See supra note 4.
68. 493 F.2d at 566. This included federal forest lands and privately owned lands on
which hunting and fishing was permitted.
69. 723 F.2d at 1404. In Colorado River, the federal suit included determination of
water rights acquired under state law.
70. 723 F.2d at 1399 (citing the district court Pre Trial Order of November 14,
1977). The Order declared that:
[A]ctual quantification of the rights to the use of waters of the
Williamson River and its tributaries within the litigation area
will be left for judicial determination consistent with the decree in this action, by the State of Oregon under the provision
of 43 U.S.C. § 666 [the McCarran Amendment].
[d.
71. The court pointedly noted that even at the time of appeal, seven years after the
state administrative proceedings were initiated by the Water Resources Department, the
state's preliminary investigation remained incomplete. [d.
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the state level.'2 Additionally, the parties did not raise the issue
of the inconvenience of the forum. 73
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the government's level of
involvement in other Oregon state water proceedings met the
government participation standard set out in Colorado River.74
However, the court found that this one factor standing alone
was insufficient to warrant dismissal.
The Ninth Circuit noted that Colorado River did not hold
that, pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, state courts had
exclusive jurisdiction over Indian water claims. 71i The absence of
the exceptional circumstances requiring dismissal,78 combined
with the limited nature of the federal proceedings, persuaded
the Ninth Circuit to hold that the district court acted within its
scope of discretion in exercising jurisdiction.
B.

Water Rights

The Ninth Circuit upheld all of the lower court holdings on
the substantive water rights of the parties except its decision not
to separately declare the rights of the United States on former
reservation lands that it owned. 77
The Ninth Circuit held that the Treaty of 1864 recognized
dual purposes for the reservation and that the district court unnecessarily determined primary and secondary purposes. 78 The
dual purposes were maintenance of traditional hunting, fishing
and trapping activities as recognized in Kimball 1,79 as well as
agricultural activities. 80 Consistent with the Walton 81 decision,
the court found implied reservations of water sufficient to fulfill
72. [d. at 1404.
73. [d. at 1407 n.12. The district judge's offer to conduct the trial in Medford or
Klamath Falls rather than Portland was ignored by the parties. [d. Distance between the
federal forum and the litigants had no relevance in Adair.
74. [d. See supra note 25.
75. 723 F.2d at 1400.
76. [d. at 1403.
77. [d. at 1417·18.
78. [d. at 1410.
79. See text accompanying note 66.
80. 723 F.2d at 1410.
81. See supra note 65.
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both purposes.82
In establishing priority dates for the reserved water rights,
the court noted that the Klamath Tribe's hunting and fishing
rights did not originate with the Treaty of 1864 but rather were
confirmed by it. 83 Therefore the appropriate priority date for the
water rights to support the rights of hunting and fishing was
held to be time immemoria1. 84 The date of the treaty was the
proper priority date for waters reserved for agricultural purposes
since this Tribe's activity did not predate the establishment of
the reservation. 811
The Ninth Circuit clarified the lower court's holding regarding the quantity of water necessary for hunting and fishing. 8s
The instream flow to which the Indians were entitled consisted
of the amount needed to maintain a moderate living standard,
not necessarily the original level of water.87
Rejecting the argument that the Klamath Termination
88
Act abrogated treaty water rights or subjected allottees to state
water law, the court upheld the water rights granted to successors-in-interest of Indian allottees. 89 The language of the Act directly contradicted the claim that reserved water rights for
hunting and fishing ended with the termination of federal
supervision. 90
82. 723 F.2d at 1410.
83. [d. at 1414.
84. [d.

85. [d.
86. "The Indians are still entitled to as much water on the Reservation lands as they
need to protect their hunting and fishing rights." 478 F. Supp. at 345.
87. 723 F.2d at 1414-15. The Ninth Circuit reiterated the "moderate living standard" set out by the Supreme Court in Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979). The Court stated that "Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that once was
thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so much as, but not more
than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood that is to say, a moderate
living." [d. at 686. An in-depth exploration of this standard is beyond the scope of this
Note, but it is important to consider the limiting effect such a standard has on the quantification of Indian water rights.
88. 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564w (1976).
89. The General Allottment Act led to the elimination of 25% of the reservation
land from tribal ownership. 723 F.2d at 1398. The majority of allotted lands shifted from
Indian to non-Indian ownership at the end of the 25 year trust period.
90. 25 U.S.C. § 564m (1976). "Nothing in [the Act) shall abrogate any water rights
of the tribe and its members." [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss1/9

14

Crow: Indian Law

1985]

INDIAN LAW

165

The court concluded that without unequivocal action by
Congress,91 an intent to abrogate treaty rights could not be imputed to the Act. To deny the implied reservation of water necessary to support hunting and fishing rights, the court would
have had to overrule Kimball 1.92 The court declined to undermine that holding by denying water rights to support the hunting and fishing rights which survived termination.
The court also rejected the contention that the Termination
Act ought to be interpreted to apply Oregon water laws to the
Tribe immediately upon termination. 93 The application of Oregon law would have resulted in forfeiture of the Klamath Tribe's
unappropriated reserved water rights. 94 The court concluded
this interpretation would directly contradict the stated intent of
the Act to prevent abrogation of tribal water rights. 96
The Ninth Circuit also significantly modified that part of
the district court opinion which held that the scope and priority
of the government's water rights did not have to be determined
because they were coterminous with the rights of the Klamath
Indians. 96 On appeal, the government claimed water rights from
two sources. The court affirmed the rights which derived from
the government's status as a successor-in-interest to the water
rights appurtenant to Indian allotments. 97 Thus, the government
was entitled to sufficient water for all practicably irrigable acreage with a priority date of 1864. 98 Because the marsh and forest
91. "Once a tribe is determined to be a party to a treaty, its rights under that treaty
may be lost only by unequivocal action of Congress." United States v. State of W88hington, 520 F.2d 676, 693 (9th Cir. 1975) cert. denied 423 U.S. 1086 (1976).
92. 723 F.2d at 1411. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
93. The appellants focused on 25 U.S.C. § 564m: "[T]he laws of the State of Oregon
with respect to abandonment of water rights by non-use shall not apply to the tribe and
its members until fifteen years after the date of the proclamation [of termination]." The
state and individual appellants contended that this section ought to be interpreted 88
applying all Oregon water laws except those relating to abandonment and non-use to the
Tribe immediately upon termination. 723 F.2d at 1416.
94. The proper interpretation of that section applied Oregon water laws regarding
abandonment by non-use to the Indians' rights beginning in 1976, fifteen years from the
date the Termination Act became effective. [d. at 1416 n.26.
95. [d. at 1416. The intent to abrogate treaty rights could not be imputed without
explicit statements by Congress. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,
413 (1968).
96. 723 F.2d at 1418.
97. [d.
98. [d. at 1419.
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contained little irrigable acreage the government also sought to
establish itself as successor-in-interest to reserved water rights.
The government argued that the water it reserved for the purposes of supporting Indian agriculture and to support Indian
treaty rights ought to be available now for the purposes of a forest and wildlife refuge with the original priority date. 99 Following U.S. u. New Mexico, the court rejected this argument. To
hold that water rights reserved for one purpose may be altered
for a new purpose would be inconsistent with the Winters doctrine which states that rights which are an exception to state
water law must be limited to the original purposes of the
reservation. 100
The Ninth Circuit also rejected any implication that the
government would succeed to the water rights reserved for hunting and fishing by holding these treaty rights to be non-transferable. lol Although the maintenance of a natural streamflow might
inadvertently benefit the government's purposes, no right to the
streamflow passed. l02 Finally, the court held that all the water
rights appurtenant to former reservation lands had been established. Since the government possessed irrigation rights with a
priority date of 1864 103 and the Indians had the hunting and
fishing rights with a priority date of time immemorial,I°4 there
were no other rights to be claimed by the government. 1011
99. [d. The water to which the government was entitled could have been left instream but "practicably irrigable acreage" would have still been the standard for quantifying their rights. Special Master's Report, supra note 58, at 12.
100. 723 F.2d at 1419, (citing United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700
(1978». The government's argument in Adair, for a new purpose for reserved rights, is of
interest to Indian tribes seeking to expand these rights to uses not contemplated at the
time of reservation. Although the government lost, a tribe putting forth a similar argument for rights originally reserved for their benefit might achieve a different result. See
S. Williams, The Winters Doctrine Under Attack published in INDIAN WATER IN THE
AMERICAN WEST: A PLANNING AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE ((Conference and Reference Material) American Indian Lawyer Training Program, (November 28-30, 1984)).
101. 723 F.2d at 1419.
102. [d.
103. [d. at 1417.
104. [d. at 1419.
105. 723 F.2d at 1419. The court explicitly left the government two possible alternatives for gaining water rights necessary to maintain the forest and wildlife refuge. First
the government could claim an implied congressional reservation of water rights for the
new purposes in the Klamath Termination Act. [d. The government did not put forth
that argument in Adair. Secondly, if after quantification. the government's water rights
proved inadequate, an appeal to Congress might be possible. In order to establish the
Winema National Forest the government acquired non-reservation lands from the public
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VI. CRITIQUE
The only questionable holding in Adair involves the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on Walton to allow non-Indian successors to
Indian allotments a right to unappropriated reserved water
rights. lOS This holding increases the alienability of the lands at
the expense of the reserved rights doctrine and the policies of
the General Allotment Act. l07
The policies of the General Allotment Act and the reserved
rights doctrine support the view that an allottee has only an appropriative right during the trust period. At the end of that period, when the allottee acquires title, the only appurtenant water
rights are those acquired by appropriation. Consequently, the
only rights the allottee could transfer would be based on the
water actually in use at the time title passed. lOS
Although it is true that the allottee would receive less
money for land sold with an appropriative rather than reserved
water right,109 this is not necessarily a "dimunition of Indian
domain in 1893, 1906, 1907 and 1930. 478 F. Supp. at 347-48. The government could
claim reserved water rights in those reservations of land. 723 F.2d at 1419.
106. 723 F.2d at 1417. The court states that the Klamath Tribe's appeal on this
issue is "foreclosed by our recent decision" in Walton without noting that the Walton
decision relied in part on the district court decision in Adair. 647 F.2d at 51. The court
utilized the lower court's reasoning that the "non-Indian purchaser, under no competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis other water users may not retain the right to that quantity of
water [the reserved right) despite non-use." Id. citing Adair, 478 F. Supp. at 348-49. In
order to conclude that an Indian allottee may transfer a right to unappropriated reserved
water the allottee must possess such a right. Walton relied on United States u. Powers
to stand for the proposition that an allottee took an individual share of the tribe's reserved water rights. United States u. Powers did not characterize the nature of an allottee's right to reserved water other than to hold that it existed. 107. See supra note 8 -for an explanation of the policies of the General Allottment
Act.
108. Isham, Coluille Confederated Tribes u. Walton: Indian Water Rights and Regulation in the Ninth Circuit, 43 MONT. L.R. 247, 259, (1982).
109. Clearly, the lands become more valuable with a right to reserved waters included. Despite the restriction on non-Indians as to loss of the right by non-use, the
amount of water would still seem to be limited only by the irrigable acreage of the parcel. One commentator noted:
[T)his would allow an aggressive non-Indian purchaser on an
over appropriated stream, rights to place the entire parcel
under irrigation even if the Indian grantor made no use whatsoever of the land. This creates incentives for prospective purchasers of Indian allotments and an attractive inducement for
allottees to sell. The rewards are as great for the idle as they
are for the sellers who have shown great dedication to agricul-
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rights" which may not be allowed by implication. llo The Ninth
Circuit, by persisting in this view, ignores two important points.
The intent of the General Allotment Act was to encourage Indian agricultural activities. Under the court's view the sale price
of the allottees' lands will never reflect the relative investment
of the allottee in appropriating water during the trust period.
The second point is that to allow non-Indians to share in tribal
reserved water rights can be viewed as a dimunition of the rights
of the entire tribe.
By upholding the district court on this point, the Ninth Circuit ignores the irony of allowing non-Indians to utilize and
compete for a resource reserved to benefit Indians. When the
purpose for which the water was reserved is gone, as when Indian lands are sold to non-Indians, the reserved right ought to
be extinguished.

v.

CONCLUSION

Adair sets a clear standard for the cases which may be adjudicated in federal court when the state court has concurrent jutural development and diligence.
Getches, Water Rights on Indian Allotments, 26 S.D.L. REV. 405, 425 (1981). The manner in which these suits arise make it clear that the addition of a right to reserved water
is a windfall to non-Indian successors. For the most part, the allotments have already
been alienated so any economic advantage will not accrue to the Indian sellers.
110. Isham, supra note 108, citing Walton, 647 F.2d at 50. The Ninth Circuit held
in Walton that it was a dimunition of rights and reversed the lower court's holding that
the land ought to be sold with only an appropriative right.
As this Note was going to press, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision on an appeal
from the district court on the quantification of rights determined in Walton II. On the
Tribe's appeal from an unreported district court opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded for an opinion consistent with its own specific recalculations. Colville Confederated Trives v. Waiton, No. 83-4285 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1985).
In recognition of the dangers alluded to in the text accompanying this note, the
court emphasized that a very careful investigation had to be made into the degree of
diligence used by non-Indian purchasers in perfecting inchoate rights. "Otherwise any
remote purchaser could appropriate enough water to irrigate all irrigable acreage with a
priority date as of the creation of the Reservation. The reasonable diligence requirement
of Walton II would be meaningless." Id.
In sharply criticizing the district court's disproportionate reduction in the water to
be awarded the Tribe for its fishery, the Ninth Circuit stated that this failure to carry
out the mandate of Walton II specifically granting sufficient water to the fishery was not
excused by concerns about overallocation of the stream. "Where reserved rights are
properly implied, they arise without regard to equities that may favor competing water
users." Id. The proper solution was to award the Tribe its full allocation subject to pro
rata reduction.
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risdiction. Given the fact that Indian water rights claims can be
resolved by a limited determination of federal priorities and that
state proceedings are notoriously slow and frequently hostile,
Adair will be an important tool for the tribes which choose to
litigate.
Margaret Crow*
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